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Attorneys have long been aware of their dual role as zealous advo-
cate and officer of the court. In Washington State Physicians Insurance
Exchange and Ass'n v. Fisons Corp.,' the justices of the Washington
Supreme Court faced a conspicuous example of the fundamental ten-
sion that inheres in that role.
This decision, handed down on September 16, 1993, marks the
court's first interpretation of WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(g) [herein-
after CR26(g)], which deals with discovery requests, responses, and
objections thereto. 2 In deciding this case, a unanimous court enunci-
ated a new objective standard by which an attorney's conduct during
discovery is to be judged for compliance with CR 26(g). The standard,
based on federal courts' interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(g), focuses on the "reasonable inquiry" provision in CR 26(g).3
But much more than providing us with a technical interpretation of the
0 B.S. 1988, Arizona State University; J.D. Candidate 1995, Seattle University School of
Law. The author expresses his thanks to all survey respondents.
1. 122 Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
2. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(g) became effective on September 1, 1985. See Adoptions,
Amendment, and Abrogation of Rules of Court, 104 Wash. 2d 1101. The rule provides:
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read the
request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation. Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(g).
3. Federal interpretations of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) are based, in turn, on federal case law
under FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Apex Oil Co. v. The Belcher Co. of New York, 855 F.2d 1009,
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discovery rule, the court completely redefined the conceptual bounda-
ries of discovery as a component of the adversarial system.
Section I of this Article will present a model of the adversarial
system and argue that the discovery process, although a component of
that system, cannot function under the model. Section II lays out the
facts of the Fisons case, the arguments presented by each side, and the
court's decision. Section III discusses a survey conducted by the
Author, which sought to ascertain the decision's impact on members of
the Seattle bar.4 Utilizing survey results and observations regarding
the adversarial system, the section then pinpoints some potentially
troublesome issues left unresolved by the court and suggests ways to
resolve them.
I. DISCOVERY AND ITS ROLE IN THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
A. The Discovery Process: Two Views
The fundamental conflict addressed in Fisons, that which exists
between an attorney's concomitant duties to both client and court,
arises from two schools of thought which have grown divergent and
seemingly incompatible over time. One school is based on policy and
rules, and recognizes the attorney's duty to the court as coming before
all others. Discovery is regarded as a process in which parties work
toward the common goal of "mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts."'  This view of the discovery process demands a holistic
approach to legal matters in which the attorney is involved, and
includes among its objectives forthrightness and candor.
The other school of thought is grounded in contemporary ethical,
professional, and societal standards, and identifies the attorney's duty
to the client as primary.6 Discovery is considered a tactical device
wielded predominantly to help the client win, rather than to ensure
procedural and systemic integrity by exposing facts or illuminating
issues. A basic philosophy shared by some lawyers is that disclosure of
1015 (2d Cir. 1988). FED. R. Civ. P. 11 contains a certification requirement similar to that of
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
4. See Appendix for a copy of the Opinion Survey.
5. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
6. Indeed, one of the most oft-quoted statements of a lawyer's duty to his client is found in
the Canons of Professional Ethics, which were adopted on August 27, 1908, and in use until 1970.
Canon 15 states, "[t]he lawyer owes 'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability ..
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
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information is to be avoided if at all possible: "Never be candid and
never helpful and make [your] opponent fight for everything."'
The conflict between an attorney's duties to client and court is
reinforced by incentives present in the system. If an attorney knows
that the opponent is going to make tactical use of discovery, failure to
respond in kind may expose the attorney to loss of the case, scorn of the
client, and possibly a malpractice suit. Indeed, even the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged the gamesmanship that occurs:
"Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure the
truth is ascertained but to advance his client's cause by any ethical
means. Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and
sowing confusion not only are his right but may be his duty."8
Unhappiness, or at least concern, with discovery practices is wide-
spread.9 Chief Justice Burger wrote that current legal practices have
created a situation in which each dispute is tried twice-once during
the pretrial process of discovery and once more at the actual trial. 10 But
for all the apparent concern, courts, both state and federal, still appear
uncertain as to how to resolve the matter. One indication of this uncer-
tainty is the dearth of decisions making use of Federal Rule 26(g), or in
Washington, CR 26(g).11 As a function of the lack of guidance pro-
7. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 250 n.54 (alteration in original).
8. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (quoting
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1975)).
9. For example, at the American Bar Association's 1990 annual meeting, lawyers, judges,
professors, and clients agreed that discovery has gotten seriously out of hand; that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure's promise of a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action" has become, at best, illusory, and at worst, a cruel joke; and that the promised benefits of
discovery are not worth the toll they take on litigants and the courts. Loren Kieve, Discovery
Reform: Maybe the Best Solution Is No Discovery At All, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 79, 80.
10. See Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. -A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70
F.R.D. 83, 95-96 (1976).
11. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(g) is essentially identical to its federal counterpart. CR
26(g) focuses on "request[s] for discovery or response[s] or objection[s] thereto" and provides
for a certification requirement similar to that of WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11. However, CR 11
was recently amended to make imposition of sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory. At
this writing, no such changes have been made for CR 26(g).
The FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments, relied upon by
the Washington Supreme Court in this opinion, state that the general policy of the rule is "to
provide a mechanism for making relevant information available to the litigants," and that the
spirit of the rule is thus violated when "advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical
weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues." Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 341,
858 P.2d at 1077 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment, 97
F.R.D. 165, 216-19 (1983)). CR 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty to engage in "responsible"
pretrial discovery. Id. at 342, 858 P.2d at 1077 (citing advisory committee's note). In addition,
CR 26(g) "makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanctions and
requires them to use it." FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments,
97 F.R.D. 165, 220 (1983).
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vided by courts, the legal community had essentially established its
own standard by which an attorney's conduct in civil discovery is mea-
sured. 12 The court in Fisons replaced that standard with a new objec-
tive one, and in doing so, reestablished the courts' control over
discovery and the rules governing it.
B. The Adversarial System: A Model
To understand the universe in which discovery and its attendant
problems exist, it is necessary to examine the guiding principle of the
American legal profession-the adversarial system. To many, the
adversarial system is a process of dispute resolution in which "the
adversaries, usually through their attorneys, are in confrontation until
they persuade the opponent to give up or the tribunal to decide."13
However, Professor Lon Fuller has suggested that the adversarial pro-
cess rests on much more sophisticated foundations: first, the presence
of a neutral tribunal; second, the preparation and presentation of the
case by the parties; and finally, a structured procedural system
designed to find the truth. 4
The presumption of a neutral tribunal is based on the notion that
the decision maker or fact finder will rely entirely on the parties or their
advocates to provide the information needed to make the decision."
Because the tribunal does not conduct any independent investigation, it
remains essentially ignorant until the case is presented for decision, and
thereby insulates itself from the dangers of forming a bias or reaching
premature conclusions. 6 This element of neutrality is missing in the
information-gathering systems employed in other countries. For exam-
ple, in Germany, the court, not the lawyers, takes the responsibility for
gathering evidence and sifting through facts.17
While the Federal Rules do not envision the pervasive judicial
involvement found in the German system, neither do they intend the
12. The standard, expressly rejected by the supreme court, was based on customary and
accepted litigation practices. See Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 344, 858 P.2d at 1078. The viability of
this standard is illustrated by the fact that both the trial court and special discovery master
adverted to it, rather than to the language of CR 26(g) or the FED. R. Civ. P. advisory
committee's notes to the 1983 amendments. See id. at 345, 858 P.2d at 1079.
13. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversarial Process and Discovery Reform,
50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 703, 706 (1989).
14. Id. (referring to Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353
(1978)). The author uses this model purely for illustrative purposes.
15. Id.
16. See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 385-86
(1978).




absolute judicial purity proposed by Professor Fuller. In the comments
accompanying Rule 26, the advisory committee asserts "[t]he rule con-
templates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and
thus acknowledges the reality that [the discovery process] cannot
always operate on a self-regulating basis .... Concern about discovery
abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a need for more
aggressive judicial control and supervision."" s The call for judicial
involvement is embodied in the sanctions provisions of Federal Rules
11, 16(f), 26(g) and 37(b), and by the pretrial conference provisions in
Rules 16 and 26(f). For example, Rule 16(a) states,
the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys ... to appear
before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such pur-
poses as (1) expediting the disposition of the action; (2) establishing
early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted
because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial
activities; (4) improving the quality of the trial through more thor-
ough preparation, and; (5) facilitating the settlement of the case. 19
The pretrial conference provisions in Rule 26(f) are similar to
those in Rule 16, but focus specifically on discovery. 20 Thus, contrary
to Fuller's assertion, increased judicial involvement is not only antici-
pated by the discovery rules, it is necessary to the proper functioning of
the rules.
The second of Fuller's foundations, that of preparation and pres-
entation of cases by the parties, is a corollary to the neutrality concept.
In our discovery system, the judge's role is traditionally a passive one.21
Judicial passivity creates the incentive for parties and their representa-
tives to make the most effective and persuasive case presentation as is
possible.22 One commentator likens this situation to a free market sys-
tem in which "competition motivated by self-interest orders human
affairs."' 23 But the presence of the self-interest incentive begs the ques-
tion of whether judicial passivity, and the adversarial process in gen-
eral, achieve desirable results in the arena of civil discovery. The
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments, 97 F.R.D. 165,
218, 220 (1983).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
20. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(0. "At any time after commencement of an action the
court may direct the attorneys to appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery."
Id.
21. Schwarzer, supra note 13, at 709.
22. Id.
23. Id. See also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 493 (3d ed. 1986) ("The
invisible hand of the market has its counterpart in the aloof disinterest of the judge.")
1994]
Seattle University Law Review
answer is "no"-judicial passivity and the gamesmanship it abets fuel
negative consequences.
Self-interest, often masquerading as client interest, fosters an envi-
ronment in which a lawyer's responsibility for substantive justice all
but disappears. Litigation becomes a game in which lawyers are con-
cerned with the production of belief, not knowledge.2 4 One author's
interviewee said, "[I]t is sometimes more fun to have a bad case than a
good one for it tests your powers of persuasion more severely. Cer-
tainly I have seldom felt better pleased than when I persuaded [the
court] to come to a decision which I was convinced was wrong .... 2
Another commentator wrote, "The system.., is not a search for truth.
Rather it is a competition to win."2 6
The adversarial approach to discovery often rewards another form
of self-interest-the desire to make money. By engaging in prolonged
and contentious discovery, attorneys can keep the meter running
longer, thereby amassing larger fees. All this comes, of course, at the
client's expense, and perhaps even at the expense of the client's case.
The last of Fuller's three foundations describes a structured proce-
dural system designed to find the truth. This postulates a climactic
confrontation in which the clash of the advocates will reveal the truth,
thus ensuring a just decision.27 The Supreme Court has agreed: "The
basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth....
But what of the many cases that never go to trial?29 The adver-
sarial model does not provide for a procedural mechanism to compel
truth in pretrial phases. Yet attorneys entering into a settlement, for
example, are no less interested in securing a just result for their clients
than are those entering into a trial. Therefore, the need exists for a
structured procedural system designed to find the truth beyond the
confines of the courtroom. It is precisely this need which discovery
rules aspire to fulfill.
24. Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium on the Law Firm as a Social Institution: Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 596 (1985).
25. Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. Rv. 1078, 1078 (1979)
(alteration in original) (quoting the Rt. Hon. Lord Cross of Chelsea).
26. Stephen A. Salzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. R~v.
647, 651 (1986).
27. Schwarzer, supra note 13, at 712.
28. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
29. "About 95% of civil cases filed in federal courts are terminated before trial." Schwarzer,
supra note 13, at 707.
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C. Discovery and The Adversarial System: Irreconcilable Differences?
The gaming notion of justice inspired by judicial passivity and
self-interest clearly frustrates the policy of the discovery rules. When
amending Rule 26 the advisory committee noted that "the spirit of the
rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tacti-
cal weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by
overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or eva-
sive responses."3 Thus the adversarial presumption of preparation
and presentation of cases by the parties, which prioritizes self-interest,
is antithetical to the policies behind the discovery rules, which priori-
tize an attorney's duty to the court.
Moreover, by focusing on the trial process as the adversarial sys-
tem's sole truth-seeking mechanism, Fuller's model disregards com-
pletely the discovery rules and their broad mission of promoting truth
and candor outside the courtroom. Therefore, in addition to the practi-
cal incompatibilities suggested in the previous analysis, discovery as a
structural mechanism is simply not contemplated by nor consistent
with Fuller's adversarial model.
The discordancies which result from the application of discovery
principles to Fuller's model illustrate the paradox faced by the court in
Fisons: Discovery, though a necessary and major component of the
adversarial system, clashes with the traditional notions which charac-
terize the adversarial system. Resolution of this paradox would, there-
fore, demand more than a technical application of the discovery rules.
A change in the general perception of discovery is required.
II. WASHINGTON STATE PHYSICIANS INSURANCE EXCHANGE AND
ASSOCIATION v. FIsoNs CORPORATION.
A. Facts Of The Case
On January 18, 1986, two-year-old Jennifer Pollock suffered
seizures caused by an excessive amount of the drug theophylline in her
system.31 The seizures led to severe and permanent brain damage.32
Jennifer's parents sued Dr. James Klicpera, the prescribing pediatri-
cian, and Fisons Corporation, the manufacturer of Somophylline Oral
30. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendments, 97 F.R.D. 165,
216-19 (1983).
31. Theophylline is a bronchodilator used to relieve symptoms of asthma and related
respiratory diseases. Fisons' Reply Brief, Response to Klicpera's Cross Appeal, and Response to
WSPIE's Cross-Appeal at 36 n.50, Fisons (No. 57696-3). At the time of Jennifer's injury, it was
one of the most widely used ingredients in asthma medications world-wide. Id.
32. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 307, 858 P.2d at 1058.
1994]
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Liquid, the theophylline-based drug prescribed to Jennifer.33 Dr. Klic-
pera cross-claimed against Fisons for damages and attorney's fees,
pointing to Fisons' failure to warn that its theophylline-based medica-
tions were potentially dangerous when given to children with viral
infections, and for damages for emotional distress.34
After nearly three years of discovery, Dr. Klicpera and his liability
insurer, Washington State Physician's Insurance Exchange and Associ-
ation (WSPIE), settled with the Pollocks.3" More than a year later, on
March 15, 1990, the Pollock's attorney received from an anonymous
source a copy of a letter dated June 30, 1981.36 Fisons originally sent
the letter to certain "Key Influential Physicians" warning them of their
need to understand that theophylline can be a "capricious drug," and
alerting them to findings of "life-threatening theophylline toxicity"
among asthmatic pediatric patients.37 Of the roughly 6,000 physicians
in Washington, only seven were included on the Key Influential Physi-
cians list.3" Of those seven, none were from Snohomish County, where
Dr. Klicpera practiced.39
After receiving the document, the attorney forwarded it to Dr.
Klicpera's attorney,4" who then alerted Judge Knight.41 The Pollocks
and Dr. Klicpera argued that their discovery requests should have pro-
duced the letter and moved for sanctions against Fisons and its coun-
sel.42 Judge Knight appointed a special master, who denied the motion,
but sua sponte expanded the scope of discovery, thus requiring Fisons
to deliver all requested documents which related to theophylline.43
Among the 10,000 documents produced was a 1985 memo from
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Fisons unsuccessfully challenged the settlement as unreasonable and collusive. See
Fisons' Reply Brief, Response to Klicpera's Cross-Appeal, and Response to WSPIE's Cross-
Appeal at 46 n.59, Fsons (No. 576-96-3). Id. The settlement provided that WSPIE would loan
to the Pollocks $500,000 which would be contributed in the event of a settlement between the
Pollocks and Fisons. Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 307, 858 P.2d at 1058. The Pollocks were
guaranteed a minimum recovery of $1 million. Id. Dr. Klicpera's liability, if he were to remain as
a party, was limited to a maximum of $1 million. Id.
36. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 307-08, 858 P.2d at 1058.
37. See Brief of Respondent/Cross-Appellant James A. Klicpera, M.D. at 8, Fsons (No.
57696-3).
38. Id. at n.8.
39. Id.
40. Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 307, 858 P.2d at 1058.
41. Brief of Respondent/Cross-Appellant Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange
& Association at 24-25 (No. 57696- 3).
42. Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 308, 858 P.2d at 1058. Fisons and its counsel responded by
arguing that Klicpera had, in essence, failed to ask the right questions, and that ethical obligations
imposed by the adversarial nature of discovery prevented them from volunteering the information.
See infra part II.B. and accompanying notes for a detailed discussion of these arguments.
43. See Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 308, 858 P.2d at 1058-59.
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Fisons' director of medical communications to the company's vice pres-
ident of sales and marketing in which the director recommended that,
due to an "epidemic" of theophylline toxicity, the company cease
promotional activities with regard to Fisons' line of theophylline
products."
The motion for sanctions was appealed to Judge Knight, who
affirmed the special master's ruling and dismissed the sanctions claim
with prejudice.4" Shortly thereafter, Fisons settled with the Pollocks
for $6.9 million, and the case was recaptioned to its present name.4 6
At trial in the Snohomish County Superior Court, Dr. Klicpera
renewed the sanctions motion.47 The trial court cited several reasons
for denying the motion: The evidence did not support a finding that
Fisons intentionally misfiled documents to avoid discovery; neither Dr.
Klicpera nor the Pollocks had moved to compel production of docu-
ments before moving for sanctions; the conduct of Fisons and its coun-
sel was consistent with customary and accepted litigation practices of
the bar of Snohomish County and of the state; and the plaintiffs failed
to prove that reasonable minds could not differ on the appropriateness
of sanctions.48
The supreme court accepted review at Fisons' request.49 Among
the parties' sixty-three assignments of error was Klicpera's cross-appeal
for the denial of sanctions for Fisons' alleged discovery abuses.50
B. The Battle
By the time the case arrived at the supreme court, the trenches had
been deeply dug. On one side was Fisons, supported by a battery of
fourteen experts, including Yale professor Geoffrey Hazard."1 The
group boasted 398 years of collective legal experience and participation
in such groups as American Law Institute, Washington State Bar Asso-
ciation, WSBA Disciplinary Committee, and American College of
44. Id. at 308-09, 858 P.2d at 1059. For the text of the memo see Brief of Respondent/
Cross-Appellant James A. Klicpera, M.D. at app. A, Fsons (No. 57696-3). "The record at trial
showed that the drug company continued to promote and sell theophylline after the date of this
memo." Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 309, 858 P.2d at 1059.
45. Fisons' Reply Brief, Response to Klicpera's Cross-Appeal, and Response to WSPIE's
Cross-Appeal at 58, Fisons (No. 57696-3).
46. Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 309, 858 P.2d at 1059.
47. Id. at 308, 858 P.2d at 1059.
48. Id. at 344-45, 858 P.2d at 1078-79.
49. Id. at 310, 858 P.2d at 1060.
50. See id.
51. See Fisons' Reply Brief, Response to Klicpera's Cross-Appeal, and Response to
WSPIE's Cross-Appeal at app. D, Fsons (57696- 3).
1994]
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Trial Lawyers.5 2 On the other side stood WSPIE, armed with the affi-
davits of only two experts.5 3
At the center of this battle of the affidavits were the two docu-
ments that, according to WSPIE, should have been produced in
response to its interrogatories and requests for production. Both docu-
ments contradicted the position taken by Fisons, that it did not know
that theophylline-based medications were potentially dangerous when
given to children with viral infections. The first document was the
anonymously-provided letter to select physicians discussing an article
that contained a study confirming reports of "life-threatening toxicity
when pediatric asthmatics ... contract viral infections." 4 The second
document, a Fisons interoffice memorandum, talks of an "epidemic" of
theophylline toxicity and of a "dramatic increase of reports of serious
toxicity to theophylline." 5
According to the court, the drug company's responses and objec-
tions to the plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production were"misleading" and "contrary to the purposes of discovery. '"56 However,
according to Fisons, its responses to the plaintiffs' interrogatories fully
complied with the scope of discovery as defined by the plaintiffs.57
The drug company claimed that any nondisclosure was due to
WSPIE's failure to ask the right questions.5 8  Fisons argued further
that WSPIE (and the Pollocks before them) failed to use available
means to acquire the documents: First, WSPIE failed to make efforts
to expand the scope of discovery to include the smoking gun docu-
ments;5 9 and second, WSPIE failed to bring a motion to compel pro-
52. Id.
53. WSPIE's experts on the discovery matter were Vernon Pearson, Justice of the
Washington Supreme Court (retired), and University of Washington School of Law Assistant
Dean Robert Aronson. See Fisons' Reply Brief, Response to Klicpera's Cross-Appeal, and
Response to WSPIE's Cross Appeal at 60 n.76, Fisons (57696-3).
54. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 338, 858 P.2d at 1075.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 346, 858 P.2d at 1079-80. For example, Request 3 stated: "Produce genuine
copies of any letters sent by your company to physicians concerning theophylline toxicity in
children." Id. at 348, 858 P.2d at 1081. To that request Fisons responded: "Such letters, if any,
regarding Somophylline Oral Liquid will be produced at a reasonable time and place convenient to
Fisons and its counsel of record." Id.
Justice Andersen noted that, "Had the request, as written, been complied with, the first
smoking gun letter... would have been disclosed early in the litigation." Id. at 349, 858 P.2d at
1081. The court concluded, "It appears clear that no conceivable discovery request could have
been made by the doctor that would have uncovered the relevant documents, given the above and
other responses of the drug company." Id. at 352, 858 P.2d at 1083.
57. See Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 352-54, 858 P.2d at 1083-84.
58. See id. at 354, 858 P.2d at 1084.
59. See Affidavit of Payton Smith at 7-8, Fisons (No. 86-2-06254-6) (Superior Court for
Snohomish County, August 31, 1990)).
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duction of the documents. 60 Fisons relied heavily on "common usage
and practice among practicing attorneys in this state" as setting the
standard of conduct in discovery. 61 The drug company's approach to
the issue was summed up by one expert: "Tendentious, narrow and
literal positions with regard to discovery are, in my opinion both typical
and expected in the civil discovery process." 62
WSPIE's position on the other hand, relied on the broad policy of"cooperation and forthrightness" behind the discovery rules and sought
to alert the court of the looming evils to be wrought by discovery pos-
tures like that of Fisons.63 One affiant for the plaintiffs opined,
I believe that the integrity of the legal profession and our judicial
system is at issue in this case. The discovery rules were intended to
facilitate the search for the truth, not frustrate it. Evasive and/or
false responses to discovery requests should not be tolerated if our
system of justice is to survive. 64
With the two sides firmly polarized, the court made its determination.
C. The Supreme Court Decides
The court's first task was to determine the proper standard of
review to apply to rulings regarding sanctions for discovery abuse.
Despite Dr. Klicpera's argument that a de novo standard should apply,
the court ruled that an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate.
Against this standard, the supreme court found that the trial court
erred in considering the opinions of attorneys and other experts as to
whether sanctions should be imposed.66 The court noted that, contrary
to the trial court's reasoning, intent to impede discovery is not a neces-
sary component to the issuing of sanctions; nor is a motion to compel
required before a sanctions motion can be filed. 67 The court went on to
state that the proper measure of an attorney's conduct is the spirit and
purpose of the rules, rather than the standard of practice of the local
60. See id. at 11.
61. See id. at 7.
62. Declaration of David Boemer at 10-11, Fisons (No. 86-2-06254- 6).
63. See Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 342, 858 P.2d at 1077.
64. Declaration of Vernon Pearson at 11, Fisons (No. 86-2-06254- 6).
65. A trial court abuses its discretion when its order is "manifestly unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds or reasons." Holbrook v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 118 Wash. 2d 306, 315, 822 P.2d
271, 276 (1992). See generally National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639 (1976) (abuse of discretion standard is to be applied when reviewing the imposition of
sanctions for discovery abuses); Snedigar v. Hodderson, 114 Wash. 2d 153, 169, 786 P.2d 781,
788 (1990) (sanctions imposed for failure to comply with discovery order would be reviewed for
abuses of discretion).
66. Fsons, 122 Wash. 2d at 344, 858 P.2d at 1078.
67. Id. at 345, 858 P.2d at 1079.
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bar, as found by the trial court.68 In addition, the court found that
many findings of fact entered by the trial court were either erroneous
conclusions of law or not supported by the evidence.69
The court determined that, for this type of discovery issue, the
proper sanctions rule was CR 26(g), which applies specifically to dis-
covery disclosures.70 Interpreting CR 26(g) for the first time, the court
articulated a new objective standard to be applied by courts when asked
to impose sanctions for discovery abuse.71
Under the standard, a court must determine whether the attor-
ney's certifications to discovery responses were made after a reasonable
inquiry and whether they: (1) were consistent with the rules; (2) were
not interposed for any improper purpose; and (3) were not unreasona-
ble or unduly burdensome or expensive.72 To determine whether an
inquiry was reasonable, the court must consider "all of the surrounding
circumstances, the importance of the evidence to its proponent, and the
ability of the opposing party to formulate a response or to comply with
the request. ' 73
Armed with this new standard, the court found that Fisons and its
counsel had failed to comport with either the spirit or letter of the dis-
covery rules in making responses to Klicpera and, therefore, faced
mandatory sanctions under CR 26(g).74 The court then remanded the
case to the Snohomish County Superior Court for a determination of
sanctions.'5 Just before that hearing, Fisons and its counsel entered
into a settlement by which they would pay WSPIE $325,000, the larg-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 339-40, 858 P.2d at 1076.
71. The rule also provides for sanctions at the court's discretion based on its inherent power.
The supreme court cautioned that this inherent power should not be resorted to when rules
adequately address the problem. Id. at 340, 858 P.2d at 1076.
72. Id. at 343, 858 P.2d at 1078 (referring to CR 26(g)).
73. Id.
74. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 26(g) states:
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose
behalf the request, response, or olbjection was made, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
It is important to note that this provision is effective without regard to fault. Sanctions become
mandatory upon the finding of a violation. Only then does the court determine whether to assess
the sanction to client, counsel, or both. By operating this way, the standard avoids placing a
burden upon the attorney to investigate his client.
75. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 358, 858, P.2d at 1085.
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est sanction ever imposed in Washington, and among the largest ever
imposed in the United States.76
III. THE FUTURE OF FIsoNS
A. Attorneys' Reactions: The Survey
Because this decision represents new law with potentially
profound but otherwise uncertain implications, the Author conducted
an informal, nonscientific77 study to assess attorneys' opinions regard-
ing the decision and its impact on the local legal community. 7 The
study is based on a survey distributed to one hundred Seattle attorneys.
In conducting the survey, the author sought to obtain, to the extent
possible, a cross-section of attorneys based on gender, size of firm, and
experience, with a focus on those who practice in the personal injury
area.
The overall response rate was fifty-five percent. The average
experience level was eight to twelve years, and seventy-six percent of
respondents were employed in firms with fewer than thirteen attorneys.
Although only seventy percent of respondents practiced in the area of
complex civil litigation, eighty-nine percent were familiar with the
Fisons case. Of those, eighty-two percent had read the supreme court's
opinion, and sixty-six percent had read additional materials relating to
the case, i.e., briefs, affidavits, newspaper articles, etc. Similarly, the
great majority (eighty percent) had discussed the case with others.
Unquestionably, the decision has seized the attention of Seattle
attorneys.
Most illuminating, however, was that seventy-four percent of
responding attorneys viewed this as a "good" decision, while only four-
teen percent thought it was "bad." Likewise, eighty-five percent of
76. Steve Miletich, Bogle and Gates Agrees to Pay Sanction for Misconduct in Suit, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 29, 1994 at Al. In the settlement agreement, Fisons' counsel
acknowledged that it advised its client to withhold the smoking gun documents. Id.
77. The Author acknowledges a lack of scientific validity.
78. See Appendix for a copy of the Opinion Survey. The responses are on file with the
author.
One survey respondent correctly noted that the components for this decision have been
present all along. However, as applied, the ruling represents a dramatic departure from previous
decisions involving somewhat mechanistic applications of 26(g). Cf. Chapman & Cole v. Itel
Container Int'l., 865 F.2d 676, 685-6 (5th Cir. 1989) (under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), the duty to
make a reasonable inquiry, which is based on an objective standard, is similar to the one imposed
by FED. R. Civ. P. 11); Apex Oil Co. v. The Belcher Co. of New York, 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1988) (Rule 2 6(g) imposes a more stringent certification requirement than Rule 11 because a
discovery request, response, or objection usually deals with more specific subject matter than
motions or papers); Royal Petroleum Co. v. Arkla, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 674 (W.D. Ok. 1990) (award
of sanctions under Rule 26(g) against attorney for filing unsigned interrogatory responses on eve
of trial).
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respondents felt that sanctions were appropriate in this case. The
remaining twelve percent were either undecided or ambivalent.79
Those who provided additional comments were hopeful, but skepti-
cally so, that the decision would have a continuing impact on the pro-
motion of honesty and disclosure in discovery.
Despite overwhelming approval of the decision, respondents were
less optimistic about the standard enunciated by the court. When
asked whether the standard provides sufficient guidance for compliance
with CR 26(g), nearly two out of three attorneys answered "no" (sixty-
two percent).
Not surprisingly, respondents thought the decision would affect
the conduct of others much more than their own. Only thirty-five per-
cent of respondents indicated that the decision has had an appreciable
impact on their own handling of civil discovery, but eighty-eight per-
cent expect the decision to have an impact on the conduct of others.
One conclusion to draw from this is that most attorneys feel that dis-
covery abuse is conduct engaged in by others, while zealous representa-
tion describes their own behavior. This view of discovery indicates the
pervasiveness of adversarial thinking in the context of discovery, and
was specifically addressed by the court: "Subjective belief or good faith
alone no longer shields an attorney from sanctions under the rules."'
Along with its practical consequences, this reasoning compels a shift in
the conceptual boundaries of discovery.
B. Remaining Issues: The Importance of Sanctions
Prior to Fisons, the mandatory sanctions provision in CR 26 (g)
had never been invoked. With regard to discovery requests, responses,
and objections, discovery was conducted essentially without any mech-
anism to enforce the underlying rules. Now, with the court calling for
a change both in attitude and behavior, sanctions have become the
backbone of the discovery rules.
The goal of the sanctions provisions has been described as"accountability," a term that recognizes an attorney's duty to court,
client, and opponent."1 By vesting the court with the power to impose
penalties upon its own initiative, an attorney should not feel safe taking
advantage of an unwary opponent. Likewise, by placing upon a court
the conspicuous limitation that a sanction be "appropriate," CR 26 (g)
79. The response was in the form of a Likert scale, ranging from one (bad) to five (good).
For example: Bad 1 2 3 4 5 Good
80. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 343, 858 P.2d at 1078.
81. Syntex Pharmaceuticals Int'l. v. K-Line Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Nos. 85-2814, 85-2949,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11420, at *6 (D. N. J. 1988).
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reserves to a court the sanction of dismissal, where the court would
dispose of an action without trial on the issues.8 2 Faced with such a
drastic measure, the attorney's accountability to the client is better
ensured. Finally, the availability of sanctions upon motion encourages
attorneys to monitor the conduct of their opponents. But does it?
The Fisons court stated, "To avoid the appeal of sanctions motions
as a profession or profitable specialty of law, we encourage trial courts
to consider requiring that monetary sanctions awards be paid to a par-
ticular court fund or to court-related funds.""3 This is a critical error in
the court's reasoning. The future success of this decision depends
upon attorney involvement. Essential to attorney involvement is com-
pensation for costs of pursuing sanctions.
Despite the court's statement that litigants should be compensated
where appropriate, the Author's survey indicates that local attorneys
are not convinced that the compensation incentive is much more than
puffery. According to the court, the purposes of sanctions orders are to
deter, to punish, to compensate and to educate.8 4 Most respondents
considered compensation to be the only objective which sanctions
would fail to meet. Without a strong compensation incentive"
(indeed, with the presence of such a disincentive), the decision's poten-
tial for changing attorneys' behavior regarding civil discovery practices
is at risk. Attorneys must be assured they will recover their costs, or
they will not request sanctions at all. If this is allowed to happen, the
Fisons ruling will be rendered impotent.
In addition, the courts or the legislature must formulate a set of
guidelines to aid in determining what is an "appropriate" sanction.
Consistency in the meting out of sanctions will fortify the deterrence
component, provide an extra measure of objectivity to CR 26(g)'s least-
objective provision, and reduce satellite litigation by providing, to
the extent possible, a finite range of sanctions options given the
circumstances.
82. See Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 138 F.R.D. 675, 682-83 (W.D. Mo. 1990). See also
Snedigar v. Hodderson, 114 Wash. 2d 153, 169, 786 P.2d 781, 788 (1990).
83. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 356, 858 P.2d at 1085. One respondent commented that this
suggestion is "ludicrous insofar as it runs contra to the whole conceptual basis for sanctions-to
compensate the opposing party for attorneys' fees incurred as the result of a party's frivolous and/
or baseless objections to a reasonable discovery request."
84. Id.
85. Of course, these incentives will not permit attorneys to whimsically file sanctions motion
after sanctions motion-such motions are governed by CR 11, which has a "reasonable inquiry"
requirement and a discretionary sanctions provision of its own.
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is no shortage of literature which debates the discovery
rules. But rather than illuminate any cohesive discovery system, the
body of literature indicates the incoherence of the present ideology. 6
The problem addressed by the court in Fisons was posed by one com-
mentator: "It is not intuitively obvious how to recast the litigation
obligations of the lawyer. We have lived so long with the emphasis on
'duty to client' that redirecting the responsibilities of lawyers to the
system is easier said than done."'8 7 Yet that is precisely what the Wash-
ington Supreme Court has attempted to do.
Discovery is and will continue to be a crucial component of our
adversarial system. By contrasting the established goals of discovery
with the foundations on which the adversarial system rests, one can
begin to sense the source of the problem, as well as its solution.
The key to understanding Fisons is to recognize that it operates on
two distinct levels. On a practical level the decision calls for a "need
for more aggressive judicial control" with regard to sanctions, and it
acknowledges that the premise of CR26(g) is that "imposing sanctions
on attorneys who fail to meet the rule's standards will significantly
reduce abuse by imposing disadvantages therefor."8 8
However, the true importance of Fisons lies in the implications
which exist on a conceptual level. In an effort to reconcile the conflict
resulting from an attorney's concurrent duties to client and court, the
supreme court called for a departure from traditional client-centered
adversarial thinking in the civil discovery context. By renouncing the
"lawyer-made" standard adopted by the trial court and special master,
and refocusing instead on the idealism-with-bite embodied in the rules,
the court redefined the boundaries of discovery as a component in the
adversarial system. Fisons presents an unprecedented opportunity for
the legal community to reshape its thinking-a change from adversari-
ness in spite of the rules to adversariness within the rules.
86. See Rhode, supra note 24, at 594.
87. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19
(1984).
88. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d at 342, 858 P.2d at 1077 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory





Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange
& Association v. Fisons Corportation 122 Wash. 2d 299
1. How many years have you been a member of the Washington
State Bar?
1-3 El 4-7 [] 8-12 El 13-18 0l 19-25 0l 26+ []
2. Before becoming a member of the Washington State Bar, were
you a member of the Bar in another state?
yes El no E If yes, which state? How many years?
3. How many attorneys are in your firm?
Sole practitioner 0l 2-12 El 12-25 El 26-50 El 51-
100 0l 100+ El
4. In what area(s) of law do you practice?
S. Do you practice civil litigation? yes El no []
6. Are you familiar with the Fisons case? yes El no El If you
answer is no, you need not continue. Nevertheless, please return
the questionnaire. The information you've provided is important.
7. Have you read the Supreme Court of Washington's opinion?
yes 0 no l
8. Have you read any additional materials relating to the case, i.e.,
briefs, affidavits, newspaper articles, etc.? yes El no El
9. Have discussed the case with others? yes El no El
10. Do you think this is a "good" decision or a "bad" one?
Good 5 4 3 2 1 a
11. Do you think that the court's opinion provides sufficient gui-
dance to ensure that attorneys will know or should know when
their conduct is sanctionable under CR 26(g)? yes El no El
12. Do you feel that the court's imposition of sanctions was appropri-
ate with regard to the conduct of Fisons or its counsel?
yes El no 0
13. As of today, what impact has this decision had on your conduct in
civil discovery? g t 5 4 3 2 1 none not applicable El
14. Do you think the decision has had or will have an effect on the
conduct of others in civil discovery matters? yes El no El
15. Whose counsel will it affect more? plaintiff El defense El
both will be affected the same El
16. As a practical matter, do you think that courts have the ability to
impose sanctions in a consistent manner? yes El no El
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17. Assuming that sanctions are imposed by courts in a consistent
manner, do you think sanctions will be effective or ineffective in
achieving the following objectives?
effective ineffective
a) punish El El
b) deter 0l 0l
c) compensate El 11
d) educate 0l 0l
18. In your opinion, did Fisons Corp. and/or its counsel breach any
duty imposed by rules of ethics? yes 0l no El
19. In your opinion, what was the most important duty owed by
Fisons' counsel?
"l Zealous representation of client
El Ethical duty as officer of the court to use but not abuse the
judicial process
El Other
20. In your opinion, did Fisons Corp. and/or its counsel breach any
duty imposed by rules of civil procedure?
yes [ no [
21. In your opinion, did Dr. Klicpera's counsel breach any duty
imposed by rules of ethics?
yes l no [
22. In your opinion, did Dr. Klicpera's counsel breach any duty
imposed by rules of civil procedure?
yes [l no 0
PLEASE PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
BELOW
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